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ficiendy stringent emission limits were applied to the firms and
the set goals were not achieved.
How can we create better incentives for new technology? I
think one thing we could do at the outset is. to the maximum ex-
tent possible. tell each firm what their legal obligations will be.
Second, we have to regulate in a way that the political powers that
be will seriously enforce the regulations. Because when we over-
regulate, the firms can count upon somebody stepping in. chang-
ing the regulations. and relieving them of their obligations. But
that leads to the problem ofknowing at what level to set the obli-
gations so that they will be politically enforceable. The problem
then, is predicting the current state of technology. The people
who know that are, of course. the industry and they are not about
to say that they should really cut their emissions back eighty per-
cent if it is cheaper to cut back forty percent.
There are a few strategies that deserve more attention. One
is not to set emission limits but rather to impose emission taxes.
This strategy emerges out of the realization that neither emis-
sions levels nor future technology need be predicted. By setting
emission ta.xes. an ongoing incentive to improve technology is
established.
Professor Alvin K. Klevorick:
Alan Miller's paper is interesting and fits very well with the
tide and theme of this Conference-learning from our past mis-
takes in order to produce an improved air pollution control law
for the 1990s. Miller diagnoses the problems with our recent for-
mulation and implementation of environmental policy. and he
prescribes a cure for those ills in the form of a different policy
direction for the future.
The paper contains interesting observations and provocative
suggestions. I concur with a number of Miller's criticisms of cur-
rent policy. but I differ with him on other aspects of the diagnosis.
Consequendy, I am not as confident as he is about the desirability
offollowing his alternative approach. Moreover. I believe that his
proposal has some difficulties of its own.
Miller begins by observing that environmental problems have
been increasingly debated in economic terms.4 Although he ac-
cepts the proposition that cost estimates are essential to sound
policy analysis, he believes that the economic framework has led
to an emphasis on the costs of control or cleanup because these
4. Id. at 69-70.
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costs are easier to measure than the costs ofharm to health and to
the environment.5 Miller, therefore, raises a caution flag about
the potential danger of ignoring soft variables or having them im-
plicitly dwarfed by a focus on more concrete, easier to measure
costs.
The caution is appropriate, of course, but the emphasis on
control and cleanup costs is not inherent in an economic analysis
of environmental problems. Such a framework calls explicitly for
a weighing of costs and benefits. It requires accounting for the
costs of harm to health and the environment as well as for the
costs ofcleanup and control. Indeed, in some studies that eschew
the economic framework one observes a bias precisely opposite to
that Miller describes: the very difficulty of measuring the costs of
environmental harms-and hence the benefits of environmental
control-leads to an exaggeration of their magnitude relative to
that of the hard control and cleanup cost figures.
The reality, however, is that both sets of costs are difficult to
measure; this is especially so when, as in the situation on which
Miller focuses, effective cleanup and control entails the develop-
ment and diffusion of new technology. It is important to recog-
nize the inaccuracy of our estimates of costs and benefits, but that
uncertainty is inherent in the kind of problem we are addressing.
A sound economic framework, a decision-theoretic policy-forma-
tion structure will recognize the variance around our point esti-
mates of costs and benefits. The policy analyst will display
alternative scenarios employing different sets ofestimates and en-
deavor to ascertain the sensitivity of outcomes under different
policy instruments to alternative assumptions about the several
costs involved.
The problem is not the economic framework and the role it
gives to cost assessment, but the adoption of cost estimation as a
tool of advocacy. In an earlier draft of the paper that appears in
the Annual Survey ofAmerican Law, Miller identified this phenome-
non with clarity when he observed that the costs of lawyers and
lobbyists is much less than the cost of pollution control. More-
over, as environmentalists and industry become more sophisti-
cated, the value of further refinements in methods to 'prove' that
the costs and benefits are higherllower will continue to increase.6
The problem derives from the biases that enter into cost esti-
mates when they are deployed to serve the purpose of an advo-
5. Id. at 70-71.
6. Id. at 71-72.
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cate as opposed to an analyst. There will be a systematic over-
estimation of the costs of change by those who will have to make
changes; inertia and bounded rationality will lead them to under-
appreciate what new technology might achieve and to overesti-
mate the costs of cleanup and control. But, at the same time,
those who will not have to bear the costs of change will systemati-
cally underestimate those costs and overestimate the benefits of
control. They will have, perhaps, an overly sanguine view of the
miracles technology may have in store. Add to the brew the ap-
propriate degree of hyperbole on each side, and one has a recipe
for an unsatisfactory analysis and an unsuccessful policy.
Miller seems to believe that policy has been successful in the
recent past when we have departed from haggling over estimates
of costs and benefits and set technology-forcing standards for in-
dustry to meet.7 His principal examples are the reduction in
chlorofluorocarbons ("CFC's") and the achievement of the auto-
mobile fuel efficiency levels embodied in the Corporate Average
Fuel Economy ("CAFE") standards. In each of these two cases,
as Miller analyzes them, the standard-setting, technology-forcing
approach was effective in encouraging engineering innovations.8
Before considering Miller's analysis, it is very important to
observe that any standard implies a particular assessment of dam-
age costs and control costs. Even if the specification of a stan-
dard-whether a target from which shortfalls are tolerated or a
firm requirement from which departures are penalized-does not
embrace the locution of costs and benefits, the standard-setting
reflects a weighing of those quantities. Costs and their assess-
ment are as important in providing incentives for the develop-
ment and use of new technologies as they are in setting static
standards or penalties.
Miller's appraisal of the virtues of technology-forcing stan-
dards in the CFC and CAFE cases seems overly rosy to me. He
regards as "obvious" the role CFC standards played in making
the phasing out of CFC's much cheaper and much easier than it
had been perceived to be only a few years earlier.9 He contends
that, without regulation, there was little incentive for chemical
companies and their customers to search for substitutes. Expec-
tations of regulation created a large market opportunity for the
application of entrepreneurial spirit to develop and introduce
7. Id. at 73-75.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 73-74.
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substitutes. 1O But the regulation need not have taken the form of
standards. Taxes on the emission of CFC's, subsidies for reduc~
ing those emissions, or grants for research all could have func~
tioned as well. Moreover, had the standard been incorrectly set,
substantial damage could have resulted from the misallocation of
resources-whether too many or too few-to attaining that inap~
propriate level of emissions.
In discussing the achievement of desired fuel efficiency
levels, Miller concludes that "the combination of CAFE standards
and higher oil prices led to a doubling of fleet fuel economy be~
tween 1974 and 1989."11 The conjunction "and" is terribly im-
portant because it is difficult to disentangle the effect of the
standards themselves from the effect of the rise in oil prices in
bringing about the fuel efficiency gain. To the extent that the oil
price increase played a significant role, one must also ask whether
a straightforward tax on gasoline consumption might not have
achieved the CAFE standard's end even more effectively. For one
must consider the possible side effects of any regulatory mecha~
nism, and the CAFE standard is no exception.
Thus, in separate articles]ohn Kwoka and Andrew Kleit have
demonstrated, for different market structures, how the CAFE reg-
ulation could have perverse effects on mileage and gasoline con~
sumption, though simultaneously having favorable impacts on
output and employment in the automobile industry. 12 Moreover,
Kleit has shown how the CAFE mechanism, with its harmonic
averaging across a company's fleet, could generate mix~shifting
within a fleet and widening of the model spectrum (regulatory
economies of scope with no beneficial resource-allocation
effects).
The full tale of the CAFE standards also has to include at
least a reference to the flexibility built into the system by provi~
sions for the carryback and carryforward of credits that firms
earned when they surpassed the set standard for a particular year.
In several years, there was also some slippage in the standards
themselves as particular firms requested permission to relax the
standard, a request allowed under the statute, and this permission
was granted by the agency.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Kleit, The Effect of Annual Changes in Automobile Fuel Economy
Standards, 2 J. Reg. Econ. 151 (1990); Kwoka, The Limits of Market-Oriented
Regulatory Techniques: The Case of Automotive Fuel Economy, 98 QJ. Econ.
695 (1983).
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In presenting his alternative approach, Miller seeks to find a
method that will serve better than "traditional cost estimates" as
a guide for policy, and he turns to the CFC experience for instruc-
tion. Once again, it is important to distinguish between the use of
cost estimates as an input to policy and the type ofpolicy they are
used to design or support. Recognizing the problems with tradi-
tional estimates of costs and benefits does not compel one to
move to a policy based on technology-forcing standards, as Miller
would suggest. For example, he cites the virtue of the CFC regu-
lation that provided a gradual schedule for compliance in several
stages. lS But the same gradual approach could have been in-
duced with a rising tax schedule, a carefully tuned subsidy sched-
ule, or a set of marketable permits.
Miller also lauds the cooperation the EPA induced by work-
ing with the affected industries to accelerate the diffusion ofinfor-
mation about promising alternatives. Although such cooperation
could be fostered under anyone of several schemes, it does seem
more likely to emerge when there is a common goal that everyone
is seeking to achieve. But the risks that cooperative ventures gen-
erate for market performance are well known and particularly sa-
lient when the cooperation occurs closer to the production stages.
Moreover, in asking whether the experience with cooperation
about CFC's can be replicated in other industries, one must be
very cautious. Technological change is not a unitary phenome-
non or process. It has a complicated character that varies from
one industry to another, and indeed there can be subtle differ-
ences with regard to different kinds of technological change in the
same industry. The delicate task of policymaking is to select ap-
proaches that match the industry and the type of technological
change we seek.
I also am more skeptical than Miller is about the prospects
for cooperation in setting standards. Why do we expect that cre-
ating the cooperative enterprise will overcome the cost-assess-
ment problems he highlighted in his diagnosis of our regulatory
ills? The problems ofnegotiation and collective decision making
will be with us. For example, one can see similar difficulties in the
structuring and operation of research joint ventures. How do we
overcome the usual revelation problems, the usual difficulties of
asymmetric and impacted information? Without answers to these
13. Miller, Cleaning the Air while Filling Corporate Coffers: Technology
Forcing and Economic Growth, 1990 Ann. Surv. Am. L., 69, 79.
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concerns how can we be confident that the industry-government
cooperation will succeed?
I worry a bit because Miller's proposal, that the nation adapt
a Japanese style government-industry cooperation to achieve en-
vironmental goals, combining economic incentives to reinforce
consumer demand with government involvement to support the
long-term development of new technology,14 sounds similar to
the oft-made recommendation that firms in one or another Amer-
ican industry should be permitted to cooperate on non-environ-
mental goals to enable them to meet Japanese competition. Why
should we believe the Japanese cooperative mechanism can be
successfully transplanted to a different social and cultural terrain?
Moreover, Miller suggests that such government involvement
would reinforce competition because firms that refused to coop-
erate would risk being left out of new markets. But the coopera-
tion among the firms that participate in the process cannot augur
well for competitive outcomes.
Overall, Alan Miller has identified some significant shortcom-
ings in our past environmental policy. But I am much less confi-
dent than he is that he has found the cure for these ills.
OPEN DISCUSSION-PANELISTS AND GUESTS
David Gordon:
In the foregoing discussion which is concentrated on costs,
the critiques have really addressed the analytical fallacy of down-
playing the costs. It is almost like shooting fish in a barrel to at-
tack command and control schemes in terms of economic
efficiency. Maybe Mr. Miller, in defending what we call the envi-
ronmentalists' position, has addressed the issue of cost per se and
said we really do not know what the costs are, but that is very
difficult to assess.
I would like to propose a different kind of analytical frame-
work and get everyone's reaction to it. In essence, it entails going
beyond and restating the environmentalists' position in a differ-
ent setting. My suggestion is that the whole concept of talking
about costs really sticks in some people's throats, because they
assume that there is a fundamental right to pollute. They also
assume that in creating social policy we have to balance the costs
of addressing what these people are doing with the benefits that
will be gained. The critique, therefore, was correct in criticizing
14. Id. at 76.
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Mr. Commoner-of course you cannot impose millions of dollars
of costs against society without taking the benefits into account.
But the present environmentalist position fails to address these
concerns.
Professor David S. Schoenbrod:
Are you suggesting that there should not be a right or a privi-
lege to pollute?
David Gordon:
What I am saying is that, in addition to your analysis, which I
think is extremely valid, there is a corresponding analysis. \Ve
also must approach the situation from the point ofview that there
is no right to pollute and then decide what industries we absolute
need in our society. For example, I am not certain we need spray
cans for hairspray or cars that get a maximum of twenty-five miles
per gallon so that General Motors can sell big cars and make high
profits.
Professor David S. Schoenbrod:
I am not sure what your statement adds other than to change
the presumptions. I do not know what that really does, because
ultimately the people who are making the decisions have to come
up with a feasible scheme for all the reasons that we have dis-
cussed so far. But I think there is a danger in saying that there is
no right to pollute. It sets up an us-them dichotomy: they pollute,
we suffer. That is just ridiculous; we have to cook our dinner, and
when we cook our dinner there are going to be emissions. So it
seems to me that as a rhetorical twist to our discussion your state-
ment is ultimately unhelpful.
Professor Richard L. Revesz:
Some of the discussion of this panel underscores the extent
to which environmentalists allowed the debate to be skewed by
opposing the quantification of benefits, and I think that is unfor-
tunate. One thing we know for sure is that if you have an uncon-
trolled externality, then the cost of eliminating the externality
would be cheaper than the benefits that result from the external-
ity. Now of course it is true you might over-regulate-that is, you
might regulate more than is necessary to maximize social welfare.
You might also not regulate in a cost minimizing way. But, the
costs we should worry about are the costs that go beyond elimi-
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nating the externality in a cost minimizing way and not the full
range ofcosts. Ifwe were more disciplined about trying to do our
best in quantifying benefits and quantifying costs in a systematic
way, I think that the debate would be much clearer and in many
cases these very large costs that are shown in the newspapers
would seem much less threatening. We would have a much better
understanding of what benefits result from the expenditure of
those costs.
Timothy D. Searchinger:
I would just like to make two brief comments. First, concern-
ing the taxes issue, one reason to favor an allocation trading sys-
tem over taxes is the large distributional consequences. A good
example is if you had sulphur dioxide without the acid rain taxes.
Not only would people have to lower their control costs, but also
they would be paying a tax even on the emissions that they had
not controlled. This may not have any overall efficiency loss to
the economy, but nonetheless, it will result in a major cost both
politically and economically. Also, it is hard to determine the tax
that is exactly necessary to get the desired economic benefits. Po-
litically, it is much harder to put the benefit in terms of taxes than
to put it in terms of the overall environmental gain. When we say,
for example, that we need a ten million ton reduction of sulphur
dioxide we have established a clear mandate as to what our envi-
ronmental goals are. In the long-run, this approach is going to be
a much more effective environmental tool than taxes. Secondly,
the reason that environmentalists have become suspicious of the
economist's cost benefit analysis is that there has been a persis-
tent under-evaluation of environmental policy. While this result
may be the product of shoddy economics and the wrong consul-
tants, it means that we cannot quantify or even describe qualita-
tively many of the environmental harms.
Donald Elliott :
Just one comment on Alan Miller's point about cultural dif-
ferences. I think that the notice and comment process, in a funny
way, is an American way of having industry and government es-
sentially negotiate what approach to take. While it is an open
process, it is a realistic process and it is a process which the public
and environmental groups can play, what is really going on is
elaborate negotiations about what in fact can be done. The prob-
lem we have had in the past is that once negotiations are con-
cluded at a particular time, we eliminate any incentive for people
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to develop technology that surpasses those standards. It is this
problem which really needs to be addressed.
Prcifessor Howard A. Latin:
I could respond to a number of things, but let me just say
that one of my principal interests is how things can go wrong.
The environmental regulatory movement is a happy hunting
ground for people who are interested in how things can go
wrong.
One thing that we really have to focus on are the incentives
that several other people have suggested. By incentives, I mean
incentives of the parties who are going to be regulated, which is in
part what Mr. Miller talked about. But it also means the incen-
tives of the people who are going to do the regulating-both the
states and the EPA. In my mind, a fundamental lesson of regula-
tion in the toxics area is that agencies are much more uncomforta-
ble about being forced to respond to questions that they cannot
answer in a relatively quantifiable and reliable way than in being
required to answer questions that result in both intellectually de-
fensible and politically defensible responses. This entire panel
criticized the best available technology approach as having all
sorts of intellectual weaknesses. But what the BAT approach
does is it gives the agencies a set of questions which they can get
information about and answer in a reasonably defensible way. In
comparison with that, how will an agency defend notions like:
"well, we are going to cut emissions by ninety-five percent or
eliminate emissions or we're going to develop new technology?"
In other words, if the EPA does not have something to fall back
on, such as looking at what technology is available now, how are
they going to establish supportable emissions levels? It is fine to
say we should do technology forcing, but from where are agencies
going to develop credible technology forcing targets? Are they
just going to pull them out of thin air? Those of you who have
worked in this area know that in the past we have had a zillion
technology forcing programs: that is, programs intended to do
technology forcing. Most of these programs have failed, in large
part due to the inability of agencies to set credible, defensible
targets.
Now, a different approach is harm-based regulation where
you try to figure out how much harm is "acceptable" and then set
emissions limits based on that determination. That approach was
in the original Clean Water Act toxies provision. It was also in the
original Act toxics provision. In the middle 1970s, the EPA
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switched from a harm-based to a technology-based regulatory
strategy in water. In the air context, the EPA did not do that in
part because environmentalists sued them and prevented them
from using costs and technological feasibility in setting air toxic
emissions levels. The result is that we now have in excess of one
hundred toxic substance standards for water, and roughly seven
for air.
I generalize to say that harm-based regulatory strategies
make agencies answer extraordinarily difficult questions because
the questions are not whether a substance can be harmful or
toxic. That is too easy. Rather, the central questions concern
what level of the substance produces what kinds of harm and
whether that level is acceptable or not. The proposed legislation,
for those of you familiar with it, imposes technology-based con-
trols. There are proposals in both the House and Senate to in-
clude more stringent harm-based standards as well.
Donald Elliott:
The current Act is a health-based standard. That is why we
have only set seven or eight toxic substance standards. The pro-
posals that the Administration made and that have been accepted
in both houses of Congress go much more to establishing a tech-
nology-based standard like under the Water Act. After these
standards have been imposed, there is a debate about what to do
with the so-called residual risk over and above what technology
mandates.
Professor Howard A. Latin:
My point is that the reason we are going to a technology-
based strategy as the dominant strategy for the Act is because, in
my estimation at least, the agency can answer those kinds of ques-
tions in a reasonably reliable way.
Donald Elliott:
Going from a health-based standard to a technology-based
standard is not what we should be doing.
Professor Howard A. Latin:
Yes, almost everyone on the panel has said we should not be
moving to a technology-based approach.
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Professor Alvin K. Klevorick:
Professor Latin's remark reminds me of the story of the ine-
briated individual who looks for a lost wallet under the lamp post
because that is the area that is best lit. You frame the policy in
terms of the questions you can answer, where the light is best,
even though those may not be the most relevant questions-you
may not have lost the wallet anywhere near the lamp post.
I want to make several comments. First, I think that I am at
one with Donald Elliott on the notion ofan eclectic approach and
a mixed system. In the comments on Alan Miller's paper, I was
attempting to suggest alternatives to the technology-forcing stan-
dard of the command and control approach and did not mean to
press for taxes or subsidies or the marketable permits as the ap-
proach appropriate in any particular circumstance. In fact, what
is necessary is a mixed system.
The second comment I have concerns the point that there
are distributional implications to a tax system. There are also dis-
tributional implications to a marketable permit system. Indeed,
that ties in with the question that was raised about granting a
right to pollute versus granting a right not to pollute because one
alternative is to distribute those marketable permits precisely to
the people who might be harmed by the emission. Thus, one
should not think that the marketable permits system is free of dis-
tributional implications.
Let me address another point that Timothy Searchinger
made about the setting of standards. Although I do want to em-
phasize that it may be with great clarity that we can say we want to
reduce emissions by a certain amount, or want to attain a particu-
lar fuel-efficiency level implicit in that statement is some weighing
of the marginal cost of damage and the marginal costs of damage
control. It is inescapable. But from an analytic point ofview, it is
worth trying to specify what the costs are, and to explain how that
standard came to be chosen.
Timothy Searchinger made a very different point about try-
ing to sell the policy once it is determined. He argues it is easier
to sell the policy politically, in terms of "here is what we are going
to do to clean up the air. We are not going to charge X cents per
gallon of gas, but we are going to say you have to reach a certain
fuel efficiency." Selling the policy is one thing; but, in terms of
understanding the policy's operation, it is imperative to realize
that when you quote a standard you are implicitly quoting a set of
costs.
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Finally, I despair at the lack of confidence in the studies that
have consistently underestimated the costs or the benefits of
clean-up or the costs of the harm to the environment. Again, one
of the advantages of laying out the costs and laying out the bene-
fits in an explicit way is that it gives you a study to criticize along
with all of the underlying assumptions.
Alan Miller took to task the Council of Economic Advisors'
Report. I5 I did not go back to read that report, but I have read
the underlying Nordhaus study.I6 You may disagree with the
quantitative assessments to which Nordhaus comes, but his laying
out of alternatives and his setting out the uncertainty about the
assessment of costs and benefits are quite carefully done in that
study. Indeed, the study enables someone who differs on those
assumptions to put in different assumptions, come out with a dif-
ferent standard, and then indicate why that standard is better.
15. Id. at 69.
16. Id. at 69 nA and accompanying text.
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